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Can a Popperean be a Multiculturalist? 
 









  Author shows how the epistemological concept of incommensurability was 
turned into a key category in political theory and then evaluates the cogency of 
category as it is used in contemporary critiques of liberalism. After recounting the 
debate between Karl Popper and Paul Feyerabend over the implications of in-
commensurability for the understanding of progress in science, the paper exam-
ines the multicultural attack on liberalism in which the concept of incommensura-
bility plays an important role.  
  The paper argues that incommensurability-based anti-liberal critiques pose a 
serious problem for a certain type of liberal theory, but not for liberalism in gen-
eral. Feyerabend and others, each in their own way, demonstrate that liberal neu-
trality and universalism are not really neutral and universal, but derived from a 
certain tradition. However, even if we accept their insights, it does not follow that 
the essentially liberal culture of consensus-building political dialogues is undesir-
able, or impossible.  
  The author believes that the political concept of incommensurability has a 
variety of implications. As a term used in philosophical attacks on liberal theory, 
its value is clear but limited. Karl Popper can not be accused of false neutrality, or 
a naive universalism.  
  At the same time, when the concept of incommensurability is used to defend a 
multi-cultural relativism, it tends to subvert one of the foundations of contempo-
rary liberal societies – the will to live together. In some contexts, the concept of 
incommensurability supports a right to remain different that paradoxically rein-
forces the most powerfully illiberal ideology of our time – nationalism. Can a 
Popperean be a multiculturalist? Of course, not.  
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  In this short paper I will present Paul Feyerabend’s attack on Popper’s “open soci-
ety”. In his book Science in a Free Society Feyerabend argues that “open society” is not 
a free society. In a very Popperean way he uses an epistemological concept in order to 
attack his former mentor. The concept in question is incommensurability.  
 My paper consists of two segments. In the first one (A) I will try to show why 
Feyerabend’s criticism of Popper’s political theory anticipates the contemporary discus-
sion between liberals and multiculturalists. In the second one (B) I will tell a story 




 Feyerabend’s provocative political relativism is inspired by his epistemological rela-
tivism. If Newton’s and Einstein’s theories are incommensurable, then it is not possible 
to rationally prove that Einstein is better than Newton. By the same token it cannot be 
proven that Western medicine is better than acupuncture, or chemistry better than al-
chemy. How then can we objectively say that humanism is better than Nazism? We 
cannot. 
 In The Logic of Scientific Discovery Popper offered a rational reconstruction of sci-
ence, while in The Open Society and its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism he de-
fended a type of liberal gradualism. He tried to show the analogy between science and 
liberalism, and he argued that critical rationalism was their common foundation. How-
ever, Popper realized that verisimilitude does not have its equivalent in politics and mo-
rality. Liberalism is a rational tradition that presupposes a commitment to reason. One 
cannot rationally prove to antirational people that they are wrong. Popper knows that 
different traditions have different conceptions of the good, and that it is impossible for 
liberals to prove anything to those who do not want to discuss at all. 
 If the others are Nazis Popper suggests much tougher measures than rational argu-
ment. Feyerabend pushes the argumentation one step further. Unlike Popper, he does 
not say that the lack of objective good makes the job of liberals more difficult, he says 
that the lack of an objective good makes liberalism no better and no worse than any 
other tradition. If one wants to identify liberalism with rationalism, then rationalism is 
as good or as bad as any other tradition.  
 Feyerabend’s attack on Popper’s liberalism is based on the distinction between 
“open exchange” and “guided exchange”. A guided exchange is the one in which inter-
action happens with the help of the rules of one of the traditions. All participants adopt 
the same set of standards. Liberal democracy is an institutional incarnation of guided 
exchange. An open exchange is completely different. The participants get “immersed” 
into each other practices because this type of exchange does not prescribe the rules of 
interaction in advance, whether an interaction happens between individuals or between 
cultures. So, Popper’s liberalism is a form of assimilationism on a national level and 
something like neo-imperialism on the international level.  
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 How is this criticism of “open society” related to the contemporary liberal-multicul-
turalist debate? 
 Liberal democracy is still a dominant form of government in Europe. European na-
tion states united in the EU are states whose nations accept liberal individualism. The 
question raised by multiculturalism is: What would happen if cultural, ethnic or immi-
grant enclaves, existing in almost all former colonial centers, decide to resist the process 
of assimilation? What would happen if the entire cultures decide to fight for the highest 
level of cultural autonomy? Isn’t the consequent multiculturalism the ultimate destroyer 
of the nation organized in a liberal-democratic way? Can cultures have a right to deter-
mine themselves like nations? 
 There are two types of multiculturalism discussed in contemporary political theory. 
The first one is usually associated with writers like Iris Marion Young, the second one 
with authors like Kymlicka and Taylor.  
 The first type mostly focuses on the problems of “oppressed groups” like women, 
homosexuals and disabled, while the second type primarily deals with ethnic minority 
groups. Those two concepts of multiculturalism are quite different but they have some-
thing in common, they question the liberal idea of equality between individuals, and in-
sist on the equality between cultures.  
 The discussion between liberals and multiculturalists can have dramatic political and 
legal consequences (the exemptions which allow ethnic minorities to protect the au-
thenticity of their cultures can cause the backlash of traditional European nationalism 
and xenophobia).  
 Can the criticism of egalitarian justice and universal human rights cause the dra-
matic disenchantment (Entzauberung) with liberal democracy? I believe it can. Radical 
multiculturalism can question the will of different cultures to live together, especially if 
other cultures are recognized only as oppressive assimilators. 
 
B 
 I would like to explain the central idea of this paper with a kind of a fairy tale. I read 
it almost twenty years ago in one of Bagwan Shree Rajneesh’s books. A few years later 
I saw a caricature based on this story in a former Yugoslav magazine Start. I do not 
know whose story it actually is. It goes like this. 
 A fairy godmother is walking through a park. After some time she sees two sculp-
tures in the distance: a sculpture of a naked male figure placed on the left side of the 
road and a female sculpture on the right. They look as if they were about to jump into 
each others arms, so the fairy godmother decides to use her magic wand. She touches 
both sculptures and they come alive. The couple immediately disappears behind a large 
bush nearby. Our fairy godmother hears strange sounds coming from the bush and de-
cides to see what they are doing. The sight she faced was not the one she expected, be-
cause she saw the male sculpture holding a pigeon with both hands, and a female 
sculpture defecating on it. 
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 How is this story related to incommensurability as a political concept? I think di-
rectly. Because it helps us to understand why cultural relativism can not be reconciled 
with liberal democracy. Incommensurability in its radical form causes the disenchant-
ment (Entzauberung, razčaranje) of democracy as it is known in the West. 
 So, the key word is disenchantment. Why disenchantment and not some other word? 
Because the word disenchantment tells us that some kind of magic is losing its power, 
that an order based on the force of enchantment may disappear. Disenchantment is the 
end of enchantment. The etymology of the word shows its origin in magic, because the 
word enchantment comes from incantare (carmina, charm) from a magical activity of 
chanting. Oxford Concise Dictionary of English Etymology says that to enchant means 
to “lay under a spell”. Merlin, king Arthur’s mentor, is one of the greatest enchanters in 
English history.1 Both words, disenchantment and razčaranje can be used to describe an 
act in which the counter magic is used or the original spell removed. How is that related 
to the story about two naked ex-sculptures or to a paper on multiculturalism? The con-
nection with the story is simple. The fairy godmother did not make dead sculptures 
come to life, since a piece of stone would not be aware of the pigeon problem. The na-
ked sculptures were in a state which resembles the one in which the bewitched people 
from The Sleeping Beauty had to spend years, just waiting to be woken up from a 
dream. The only difference is that the sculptures were frozen and aware of their misery, 
unlike the Sleeping Beauty people who were fast asleep. The thing I want to stress is the 
closeness of enchantment and dreaming.  
 Paul Feyerabend, while recalling how the idea of incommensurability occurred to 
him writes: “‘Making a discovery’ I said ‘often is not like finding America, but like 
waking up from a dream’” (Feyerabend, 1986: 67). A few pages later he describes a 
theory shift, and points out: “...We certainly cannot assume that two incommensurable 
theories deal with the same objective state of affairs...hence, unless we want to assume 
that they deal with nothing at all we must admit that they deal with different worlds and 
that the change (from one world to another) has been brought about by a switch from 
one theory to another. Of course, we cannot say that the switch was caused by the 
change (though matters are not quite as simple as that: waking up brings new principles 
of order into play and thereby causes us to perceive a waking world instead of a dream 
world)” (Feyerabend, 1986: 70). A new revolutionary solution makes scientists feel as if 
they have woken up from a dream. For Feyerabend and Kuhn it is, of course, just shift-
ing from one dream to another, to a new dream in which one believes that one is awake. 
Unlike the sculptures, who are creatures turned into stone but awake, and the characters 
from The Sleeping Beauty who are unconscious, participants in a scientific revolution 
have a strong feeling that for the first time they are seeing reality with their eyes open.  
 
1 Croatian word razčaranje is not used in everyday language like German word Entzauberung or English 
disenchantment. As a matter of fact words like razčaranje and odčaranje are almost never used, however the 
magical origin of the very concept of disenchantment (razčaranje) is perfectly clear. The reason for that is the 
word čar (magic, spell, allure) which was originally a magical taboo term used by the ancient Slavs and Baltic 
Slavs. The word čar provides the etymological root, the foundation for words like čarobno – charming, 
beautiful, čarobnjak – enchanter, sorcerer, razočaranje – disappointment, čarolija – magic speel, čarobni 
štapić – the magic wand, očarati – to bewitch, and for many others.  
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 When Popper was writing about the difference between the open and the closed 
society, he made an Enlightenment type distinction between reason and magic. In his 
opinion World War II started because “this civilization has not yet fully recovered from 
the shock of its birth – the transition from the tribal or ‘closed society’, with its submis-
sion to magical forces, to the ‘open society’ which sets free the critical powers of man” 
(Popper, 1986: 1). The closed society is under a spell. The historical shift from the 
closed to the open society is not for Popper just another incommensurable dream-world, 
but more like a rational liberation from the magical spell of tribalism.  
 Richard Rorty also stumbles upon the word dream in his pro-American writings. He 
insists on a liberal utopia, which is something like a dream; his society as he would like 
it to be. Rorty explains: “You have to describe the country in terms of what you pas-
sionately hope it will become, as well as in terms you know it to be now. You have to 
be loyal to a dream country rather than to the one to which you wake up every morning” 
(Rorty, 1998: 101). “Common dreams” keep individuals and cultures together. Rorty’s 
dreaming is like a self-imposed spell.  
 So, scientific theories are dream-worlds, the closed society is determined by magical 
powers, and ‘common dreams’ are social glue. How are they all related to ex-sculptures 
and political incommensurability? 
 I would like to establish a relationship by imagining a big park packed with sculp-
tures of different sizes. Some of the sculptures in my park consist of a few different 
characters. For example a knight on a horse fighting a dragon. Imagine this to be an 
enormous sculpture which for ages prevented the sunlight from warming the nearby 
sculpture of a tall old man. His is green and covered with moss. Or, what if there is a 
small sculpture of a girl walking behind the horse who just can not stand the sight of the 
horse’s legs any more. Let us imagine what would happen if our fairy godmother uses 
her magic wand on all of them. Would the dragon and the knight continue their fight? 
We can easily imagine the tall man removing the moss from his face and rubbing it into 
knight’s or horse’s face, or a girl happily running away from everybody. The most seri-
ous political question is: What if ex-sculptures recognize pigeons in each other? 
 Feyerabend’s concept of the “open exchange” implies that that the ex-sculptures 
from the original story would fuse into something new and better. But, as we learned 
from the fairy tale, the result of the fairy godmother’s activity was a joint attack on pi-
geons, not a romantic embrace. It is not difficult to think of examples of political pigeon 
hunting. The young Marx talks about the first phase of communism which would in his 
opinion be dominated by an attempt to wipe out individual talents and differences. 
During the French Revolution Sans-Culottes were not killing only the political enemies 
of the revolution, but anyone who looked suspicious, including people who were too fat 
and nicely dressed. A few years ago a group of the New School feminist students called 
their historical research ‘shestory’. One of the first things usually done by successful 
nationalist movements is to purify their languages of foreign words.  
 In my opinion, the attack on pigeons quite often precedes “open exchanges”. It is an 
act in which those who actually suffered, or strongly believe they did, take justice in 
their own hands. Incommensurability questions the common-dream-spell and makes 
dubious the very idea of staying together in the same park. The ex-sculptures may easily 
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fall into conflict. It is not prudent to expect an “open exchange”, when we can easily 
end up having something like defecation of everybody against everybody, or to put it 
more scholarly – faex omnium in omnes. 
 Finally – can a Popperean be a multiculturalist? Of course, not. However, the argu-
ment based on the incommensurability of cultures has to be taken seriously. Instead of 
the post-Cold War optimism we will have to adopt liberalism with a skeptical face.  
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